This paper studies the e¤ects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and students, in a set-up where their e¤ort a¤ects the students' educational attainment. We show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the e¤ectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive effect of lowering the students' attainment. In a simple dynamic set-up, where the reputation of the schools a¤ects recruitment, we show that increased competition leads to segregation of pupils by ability.
Introduction
Policy makers across the world are trying to improve the performance of the education system. Reforms have centred around ideas which the economics literature has identi…ed as essential in in ‡uencing the performance of commercial organisations, such as the provision of incentives linking individuals' monetary reward to their performance and the creation of vestigial forms of competition between institutions.
There are however fundamental di¤erences between commercial organisations and educational institutions. 1 The lack of a monetary measure for the performance of an education institution is an obvious one, but, no less importantly, education establishments (schools and universities) use a customer-input technology (Rothschild and White 1993, 1995) : the characteristics of the users of an educational institution, that is of its customers, a¤ect the quality of its output. This is true both of the pupils' ability, 2 and of the e¤ort they exert while at school. 3 The aim of the paper is to illustrate the consequences of these features of the education production process on the way incentive schemes and competitive mechanisms operate. We study the interaction between schools, students, and employers. Employers form expectations on the ability of the school leavers, and o¤er them a wage which depends on this expectation. Schools, and their teachers, make investments; these in ‡uence the schools' results, both directly and indirectly, by attracting abler students. Last but not least, the students themselves exert e¤ort while at school, thus a¤ecting 1 An exhaustive discussion of the distinctive economic features of the education industry is in Winston (1999) .
2 This is known as the "peer group" e¤ect: students learn better if they are in a group of abler students. This is a reasonably well documented phenomenon, see Moreland and Levine (1992) for a survey from a psychology/education viewpoint, and Summers and Wolfe (1977) , Henderson et al. (1978) for early economic empirical studies and Epple et al. (2000) and Zimmer and Toma (2000) for more recent ones. From a theoretical viewpoint, the analyses of Arnott and Rowse (1987) and de Bartolomé (1990) were among the …rst to take the peer group e¤ect explicitly into account. 3 Empirical studies rarely include students' e¤ort as an independent input in the education production function: this is probably due to the di¢culty of obtaining independent measures of e¤ort. The one exception we are aware is Bønnesronning's (1998) study of Norwegian schools. His analysis provides positive and signi…cant estimates of student effort on student achievement. Also he …nds that students e¤ort is a¤ected both by school factors and family characteristics. At a theoretical level, the literature is equally scarce; the one analysis we are aware of is the undeservingly little noticed paper by Correa and Gruver (1987) .
their own quali…cation. As the paper shows, the interaction among these groups of agents is very complex, and it is shaped powerfully, and in oftenunexpected ways, by the environment created by the incentive mechanisms and the competitive framework in which schools operate. Both of which are of course shaped by government policy. Students maximise their expected future earnings, reduced by the cost of e¤ort, and employers maximise expected pro…ts. If these objectives are canonical within economic theory, there is no standard choice for the objective function of schools. The assumption of this paper is that a school aims at maximising the average quali…cation of its students, reduced by the investment cost. 4 As any teacher knows, this is realistic and plausible, even in the absence of any explicit mechanism linking pay to performance. However, government policy can strengthen the importance of a school's results in the school's objective function, for example by explicitly linking the teachers' remuneration and chances of promotions with the results obtained by the pupils at their school. 5 In Section 3, we study the benchmark case of an isolated school. We show that the theoretical link between the provision of incentives and the educational output is ambiguous: more powerful incentives may have the perverse e¤ect of lowering the e¤ort exerted by the students .
In Section 4, we study two competing schools. Introducing competition, typically by freeing parents from the rigid link between their residence and the school attended by their children, is a major plank of many reform proposals, including those referred to in footnote 5. While there are some theoretical analyses of the role of competition between state and private schools (for example Epple and Romano's (1998) analysis of the e¤ects of a 4 Size may of course also matter. We prefer to concentrate on students' results and therefore we …x exogenously the size of the schools we consider.
5 There are many examples. In several US states and districts teachers are o¤ered bonuses and/or salary increases for meeting or exceeding academic objectives (as an example, a pilot programme in Denver, Colorado, involving 15 schools and 450 teachers who could receive up to $1,500 in bonuses, based on (i) increases in student performance on standardised tests, (ii) increases in student performance on teacher-developed assessments, and (iii) increases in teachers' skills and knowledge; see BRT and NAB 2001) . This principle has been enshrined in the US blueprint for school reform (US Congress 2002). In the UK, the Labour government is implementing a performance related pay system for teachers and head teachers (see www.dfee.gov.uk/teachers). In the Australian state of Victoria, union and the state government agreed in 2001 to link teachers' promotions to improvements in student learning monitoring via state-wide testing (Victorian Government 2001 ). An important policy experiment was conducted in Israel recently which aimed to measure the responsiveness of result to …nancial incentives: see Lavy 2002. vouchers scheme), and empirical analyses of the e¤ects of competition both between state and private institutions and for institution within the public sector, 6 theoretical analyses of competition within the public sector are rare. 7 In Section 4.1, we assume that schools try to attract high ability pupils. They can do so both by improving their teaching environment and by undertaking activities that do not improve the quality of their teaching; examples are "marketing" expenditures, mail shots, fairs, brochures, open days, and so on, and the administration of interviews and admission tests. And, as our examples show, it may well happen that an increase in the power of the incentives scheme has the perverse e¤ect of a reduction in the average quali…cation obtained by the students.
The e¤ectiveness of the competitive mechanism may also have ambiguous e¤ects on the schools' result. When the students become more responsive to changes in the schools, schools devote more e¤ort to recruiting them, increasing the marginal cost of teaching e¤ort, thus reducing the latter and the students' attainment.
An important factor in ‡uencing parents' preference for schools is the reputation created by the past performance. 8 The simple dynamic model based on this idea in Section 4.2 shows that reputation can be self perpetuating: abler children attend the school which performed better in the past, and because this school has abler pupils, it will also perform better in the future, and so on. However, the e¤ects of reputation on the student-teacher interaction are ambiguous. It may happen that the "better" school (namely the school with superior results) is in fact the school where students and teachers work less hard: results are better simply because abler students are enrolled. Competition also creates segregation by ability: the gaps in average ability between the two schools and in their result increase as parental choice becomes more responsive to past results. 6 For example, Borland and Howsen (1992) , Hoxby (1994) , and Dee (1998) , show that additional competition from private schools improve outcomes for students in public schools in the US. Hoxby (2000) shows that schools choice in the US raises school productivity. Bradley et al. (2001) show that, over the period 1993-1998, competition among secondary state schools in the UK led to increases in e¢ciency.
7 De Fraja and Iossa (2002) study the case of competition between two not-for-pro…t universities located in di¤erent towns. 8 In the UK, the government has published all the state schools results in a variety of dimensions. Several newspapers use this data to construct highly popular -and in ‡uential-"League Tables" of the various schools. Gibbons and Machin (2002) have documented the e¤ects of the rankings obtained form these tables on house prices in England and Wales.
One interpretation of our results illustrating ambiguous e¤ects of incentive schemes is that they may provide an explanation for empirical studies which suggest that additional investment in schools resources may not have an impact of results. 9 To the extent that more powerful incentives are costly -which is the case if teachers are risk averse -, then, according to our analysis, an increase in the power of incentive schemes increases the resources available to schools, while having ambiguous e¤ects on performance. In a naive view of the world, ceteris paribus, additional resources would improve results; but, if the additional resources also a¤ect the trade-o¤s of the agents participating in the education process, their actions will also change, and therefore the assumption of ceteris paribus cannot be warranted, and the full analysis must also include the potentially o¤setting e¤ects operating indirectly via the actions of teachers and students.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we present the actors of the model: students, schools, and employers. Section 3 studies the benchmark case of a monopoly school. In Section 4.1 we study the interaction between two schools, which can use resources to attract students. Finally in Section 4.2, we consider a simple model of dynamic interaction between schools, where demand for places responds to past results. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
The model
We study the education system of an economy. This comprises three groups of agents: students, schools and employers. They are described in detail in the subsections below.
Students
There is a continuum of individuals in the economy, identical in every respect except their ability. This is measured by a unidimensional parameter µ 2 £ µ IR + , distributed according to a di¤erentiable function © (µ), with © 0 (µ) = Á (µ). The average ability of the individuals is given by µ, 9 Hanushek (1986) is an in ‡uential early survey. More recently, similar result are obtained by Betts (1995) , Heckman et al (1996) , and Dearden et al. (1997) . Some of these studies are analysed by Card and Krueger, who conclude that "there is some evidence that school resources a¤ect earnings and educational attainment, although much uncertainty remains in the literature" (1998, pp. 39) . µ = R µ2£ µÁ (µ) dµ. All individuals attend school, and, subsequently, enter the labour market. When at school, they exert e¤ort e 2 E µ IR + . This measures how diligent she is, how hard she works and so on; it also includes parental e¤ort, such as checking homework. e has a utility cost measured by a function Ã (e), increasing and convex, Ã 0 (e) ; Ã 00 (e) > 0. We assume that, while at school, and, therefore, when they choose their e¤ort, students know the ability distribution of the students' enrolled at their school, but not their own ability. This tallies with the idea that the education process is one of the ways in which we learn our ability. The advantage of this speci…cation is that all students in a given school exert the same level of e¤ort (which simpli…es the analysis and would not necessarily happen if students knew their own ability). 10 A student leaves school with a quali…cation, described in detail in Section 2.2, and enters the labour market. Here, she receives a wage, which depends on the employers' expectation of her productivity, which in turn depends on her quali…cation and the employers' inference about her ability. This is derived below, in Section 2.4. A student's objective function is the maximisation of the di¤erence between expected future wage and current e¤ort.
Schools
Students attend school and leave with a quali…cation. This is a variable q taking values in a continuum: 11 q 2 Q µ IR + . The realised value of q is a¤ected by four factors.
The …rst two may di¤er from individual to individual: her e¤ort while at school, e, and her ability, µ. The other two characterise the school and take the same value for all the students at a given school i: the quality of the teaching s i 2 S µ IR + , and the average ability of the students in the school, µ i . The latter captures the "peer group e¤ect". The variable s i , on the other hand, captures the idea that a school can make investments which a¤ects its quality. The nature of the school's investments is quite complex. We posit that they can be of three conceptually distinct types, depending on their timing and on their e¤ects. Speci…cally, part of a schools' investment is constituted by activities which are …xed before the students are enrolled at school and have therefore the feature of a durable investment. These can themselves be divided into two parts; some of it improves the quality of the school's teaching: the quality of buildings, classroom equipment, computers, sporting facilities, teachers' quali…cations and so on. A second part does not directly a¤ect the quali…cation of its students: in this category belong expenditures which are aimed towards student recruitment, such as advertisement brochures, the organisation of visits for prospective pupils and their parents, and generally what can be classi…ed as "marketing" in a wider sense. The third component of the school's e¤ort is instead expended once the students are at school, and it a¤ects directly the process of learning. It is given by the teachers' e¤ort in the activities in the classroom, by the time they spend outside teaching hours to prepare lessons, to assess the students' work, to meet parents, and so on. By its very nature, while the school's investments are observable by parents, they are not contractible, and so neither can the school commit itself to a speci…c level for them prior to enrolling the students, nor can a government agency, or indeed the parents, require the school to make them, or agree to reward the school for undertaking them.
We capture formally the discussion in the above paragraph by letting the variable s 2 S µ IR + measure the school's teaching quality and we assume it to be given by:
where z is the e¤ort exerted before students join the school, and x the e¤ort exerted while students are in the school. The assumption that ¹ < 1 implies that a fraction (1 ¡ ¹) of the durable investment is directed towards activities which do not directly a¤ect the quality of its teaching, and so do not a¤ect directly students attainment.
Thus we can let a student's quali…cation be denoted by q ¡ e; µ; s i ; µ i ¢ (an error term could be added without altering the result), with all partial …rst derivatives are positive: ceteris paribus, a student obtains a better quali…-cation who works harder, who is abler, who receives better teaching, and who has abler classmates. We simplify the analysis by taking the following speci…c functional form for q:
This formulation has a very natural interpretation: a student's quali…cation is proportional to her individual characteristics, e¤ort and ability (note that taking their sum amounts to little more than a normalisation). The coef…cient of proportionality is given by the school's characteristics: teaching quality s i and average ability of the pupils, µ i . In view of this, it is natural to refer to g (¢) as a measure of the school's quality.
A school pursues an objective function which depend positively on the average quali…cation of its students and negatively on the teaching e¤ort:
where e (µ) is the e¤ort level exerted by students of ability µ. The function ³ (x + z) is increasing and convex, ³ 0 (¢) ; ³ 00 (¢) > 0, implying increasing marginal disutility of e¤ort. Additivity between the two components of e¤ort and between the disutility of e¤ort and the students' average quali…cation are simplifying assumptions. In view of the functional form (2), the objective function of the school (3) can be written as:
where e is the average e¤ort exerted by the school's students.¸is an important parameter in the paper. It measures the importance of the students' quali…cation for the school's payo¤ relative to the cost of e¤ort. It is affected by the policy instruments used by the government to provide incentives to teachers, and we therefore couch our analysis in terms of the e¤ects of changes in¸on the behaviour of the education system. 12
Schools choose their investment and their e¤ort. In the benchmark case, studied in Section 3, the school takes as given the characteristics of the students it enrols. Subsequently, in Section 4, we allow schools to a¤ect the ability of its pupils.
The game
To sum up the description of the model, we study the following three stage game:
² in the …rst stage, schools choose their investment, z.
² in the second stage, students and schools simultaneously and independently choose their e¤ort levels, e and x;
² in the third stage, described and solved in the next subsection, employers observe each school leaver's quali…cation and make her a wage o¤er.
We study the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game, which in our case, implies that in each stage players correctly anticipate the actions which will be chosen in the subsequent stages, and that employers' beliefs about the students' ability are consistent with the strategies employed by the students and schools in the …rst and second stage.
Employers
The focus of our paper being on the interaction between schools and students, we model the labour market as simply as possible. We assume that an individual's output in the labour market depends on the quali…cation obtained at school and on her innate ability:
This relationship is deterministic; adding an error term would not alter the qualitative nature of the analysis. Moreover, there are no externalities or economies of scale in production, so that a worker's output does not depend on the characteristics or the number of her fellow employees. There is a competitive labour market, so that employers bid each worker's wage up until they make zero expected pro…ts from employing that worker.
This implies that an individual's wage is given by the expected value of that individual's output:
where f (µ; q) 2 IR + is the density of the representative employer's belief about the ability of a student whose quali…cation is q, the information available at the time that worker is hired.
We consider pure strategies only, which seems natural in the present setup. Therefore, all students in a given school exert the same level of e¤ort, say ¹ e, and therefore employers can infer exactly a student's ability from her quali…cation; this is so because, given the school's quality, there is a one-toone relationship between ability and quali…cation. It follows that f (µ; q) is a discrete distribution, with the entire mass on a single point µ 2 £. The requirement that the equilibrium is Bayesian implies that the employers' beliefs about the students' ability are consistent with the strategies employed by the students and schools in the earlier stages, and therefore the mass point of the employers' belief is the true value of a student's ability. To sum up, for an individual with ability µ and quali…cation q from school i:
3 A benchmark case: the "monopoly school".
In this section we study the monopoly school. This is not only a realistic benchmark, applying as it does to all situations where the number and characteristics of the students attending a school are exogenously given, but it also constitutes the foundation for the study of the more general case where schools interact with each other. Although the interaction between a school and its students is a game with an in…nite number of players, it can be studied in fairly simple terms, in view of the fact that students do not know their ability and therefore behave in the same way. Let z be …xed and known to all concerned. Consider the representative student …rst. She takes as given the e¤ort choice of the school and of all her fellow students, as well as correctly anticipating how employers will behave when o¤ering wages, and she maximises her expected wage, net of the utility cost of her e¤ort. Her maximisation problem is stated formally in the next result.
Lemma 1 Let e be the average e¤ort exerted by the other students. The maximisation problem of a student at school i is given by:
Proof. The maximum wage that an employer is willing to pay to a student who has quali…cation q is given by
and b µ is the employer's inference about the student's ability, and is therefore given by:
Substitute (7) into (8) to obtain that an employer's inference about a student with quali…cation q is given by e + µ ¡ e. The rest of the Lemma follows.
The lemma captures the fact that a student tries to manipulate the signal determined by her quali…cation, by working, as it were, harder than her colleagues. Of course, in equilibrium, every student is trying to do precisely this, and therefore all students exert exactly the same level of e¤ort, so that no student is in fact able to manipulate the signal provided by her quali…cation.
The school's decision of e¤ort is more straightforward: a school takes the e¤ort level of the students as given, and maximises (4). The next result characterises the Nash equilibrium of this stage of the game.
Proposition 1
The Nash equilibrium of the second stage game 13 is given by the simultaneous solution of the following two equations in e and x:
Proof. Derive the best reply function of the representative student …rst. Di¤er-entiation of the LHS in (6) with respect to e yields the …rst order condition:
1 3 We assume that the relevant second order conditions are satis…ed. For this to be the case, a su¢cient assumption is
for every q 2 Q, for every µ 2 £, for every s 2 S.
In equilibrium, e = e, and (11) becomes (9). Consider the school next: to obtain (10) di¤erentiate (4) with respect to x, noting that the second order condition is satis…ed, since g ss (¢) < 0 and ³ 00 (x) > 0.
The equilibrium derived in Proposition 1 can be studied with a graphical analysis, without the consideration of explicit functional forms.
We begin by determining the e¤ect of a change in the school's characteristics on the e¤ort exerted by the representative student.
Proof. Total di¤erentiation of (11) yields:
where
For this to be less than 1, it must be:
which establishes the Lemma.
Lemma 2 allows us to determine diagrammatically the equilibrium value of e in a Cartesian diagram with e and e on the axes. Note that e (e) can be interpreted as the best reply function of an individual student: given that the rest of the students exert e¤ort level e, e (e) is that student's optimal response. At the intersection with the 45 degree line, where e = e, the student exerts the average e¤ort level, and so every student will also do so. When de de < 1 the solid curve in Figure 1 intersects the 45 degree line from below, as depicted. The condition required for the term de de to be less than 1 is weak: essentially it is satis…ed as long as the second cross derivative ¼ qµ (¢) is not "too high", that is, if the e¤ect of quali…cation on productivity does not raise "too much" with ability. In what follows, we assume it to be satis…ed. The diagram can be used to illustrate the e¤ect of a change in the school's characteristics, g (¢) on the e¤ort exerted by the representative student. Total di¤erentiation of (11) gives: When (13) is positive, school quality and students' e¤ort are complements. There is a kind of "multiplier" e¤ect of an increase of a school's quality: a better school increases the marginal bene…t of a student's e¤ort, making it worthwhile for her to work harder, in order to improve her signal to the market: but, if one student works harder, then all students do. This improvement in students' e¤ort enhances the improvement in quali…cation due to the increase in the schools' teaching quality. If the sign of (13) is negative, school quality and students' e¤ort are substitutes: an increase in g brings about downward shift of the curve e (e) and therefore a reduction in students' e¤ort. Students respond to an increase in the school quality by reducing their own e¤ort, which (partially) o¤sets the bene…cial e¤ect of increased quality.
This discussion, of course, only illustrates part of the story, because the school itself responds to changes in the students' behaviour. To study this, consider the game between a school and its students; we derive in Lemma 3 the slope of the best reply functions of the school and the students, 14 in the (x; e) cartesian plane. We also determine the comparative statics e¤ect of changes in the power of the incentives, which, as discussed above, we proxy with a change in¸, and of changes in z, the investment level determined in 1 4 Note the slight abuse of terminology: students do not take actions in concert, and the term "the students' best reply function" is to be interpreted as "the equilibrium level of e¤ort of the students as determined in the subgame where students choose e¤ort taking the school quality as given". the …rst period.
Lemma 3 The students' best reply function satis…es:
The school's best reply function satis…es:
dx d¸=
Proof. (14), (15) and (16) are immediate from total di¤erentiation of (11), having substituted e = e. With regard to the school best reply function, totally di¤erentiating the …rst order condition (10) with respect to x; e;¸and z yields:
And the rest of the Proposition follows easily.
In Figure 1 , we have depicted the students' and the school's best reply functions (as the solid lines). The latter (for which we give two possible positions) is increasing, by (17); the former has slope given the sign of (14). This is the same as the sign of de dg(¢) , the response of an individual student to changes in the school's characteristics, which is given in (13). It is decreasing if school's quality and student's e¤ort are complements, increasing if they are substitutes. We have drawn Figure 2 in the heuristically plausible case in which they are complements for low values of x (and hence g (¢)) and substitutes for higher values of x and g (¢): note that g (¢) is the coe¢cient of the negative term ¼(¢) in the numerator of (13) (16), we see that the students' best reply function does not move, and, from (19), the school responds to an increase in¸with an increase in x: the best reply curve shifts up.
The e¤ect of a change in¸on the equilibrium depends on whether the students' best reply function is upward or downward sloping. If the school's quality and the students' e¤ort are complements then, as shown in the lower part of panel (a) in Figure 2 , both the school's and the students' e¤ort increase, and so, clearly, will the average quali…cation of the students: strengthening incentives makes teachers and students work harder and improves results. However, if the school's and the students' e¤ort are substitutes, as is the case for the higher curves in the diagram, then the best reply function of the students is sloping backwards, and the students' e¤ort decreases in response to an increase in¸, and the overall e¤ect on attainment is ambiguous. 16 This is consistent with the Lavy's empirical 1 5 The …gure does not print the iso-utility curves, so as to avoid cluttering the diagrams.
It is however immediate to verify that both the school and the students would bene…t if they could …nd a way to commit to higher levels of e¤ort, as shown by Correa and Gruver (1987) , irrespective of whether the school's and the students' e¤orts are substitutes or complements.
1 6 It could happen that, at their intersection, the school's best reply function is steeper that the students' best reply function. In this case, an increase in¸would unambiguously …ndings (2002): he studies a policy experiment in Israeli schools, and …nds that teachers improve their e¤ort in response to …nancial incentives, and that students' attainment improves as a result.
In panel (b) we consider e¤ects of changes in z, which is determined in the …rst stage. From (18), an increase in z shifts the school's best reply function down, and the students' best reply function to the left. The school's reduces the component x of its e¤ort; the students also reduce their e¤ort if the school's and the students' e¤orts are substitutes or if, loosely speaking, the students' best reply function shifts less than the school's.
To complete the analysis of the game described at the beginning of Section 2.3, we need the determination of the variable z. This is conceptually simple, as there are no strategic actions by the students: the school simply chooses the value of z which maximises¸¡e
, where the second stage variables, e and x, are themselves functions of z.
Competition between Schools

Investment choice by schools.
To the extent that their payo¤ depends on the average quali…cation and that the latter depends on the ability of its students, schools may rationally try to improve their average quali…cation by recruiting abler students, if allowed to do so. 17 In this section we investigate this possibility. Speci…cally, we assume that students (or their parents) can choose which schools to apply for and that they make their choice on the basis of the observed values of the schools' characteristics; if a school is oversubscribed, it can, to some extent, select higher ability applicants. In this subsection, the relevant school characteristic is the value of the "investment" of the schools, namely the decrease both the students' and the school's e¤ort. A brief consideration suggests however that this equilibrium would not be "stable" under plausible adjustment mechanisms. This possibility will be disregarded in what follows.
1 7 This is precisely what happened in systems, such as New Zealand, where competition was introduced. Schools try to be authorise to have an "enrolment scheme" whereby they can establish criteria for preference in the admission of applicants. The evidence suggest that schools attempted successfully to select pupils from socially advantaged backgrounds (Fiske and Ladd 2000, pp 216-223) . According to Fiske and Ladd "the system quickly ‡ip- ‡opped in some [..] areas from one in which parents and children choose schools to one in which schools choose students" (Fiske and Ladd 2000, p 9, our emphasis).
component z of the school's e¤ort, and in the next subsection the past results obtained by the two schools. We have therefore two policy instruments: in addition to the strength of the incentives in place for schools and teachers, the e¤ectiveness of the competitive mechanism between schools is also clearly a¤ected by policy decisions. We assume that there are two schools only and that each schools' size is …xed to 1 2 of the total students population each. This simpli…es the analysis and captures the main aspects of competition. The general model of Section 3 is ill suited to the analysis of situations where the distribution of individual abilities within a school is endogenously determined. We therefore introduce the following assumptions:
. (22) Without explicitly modelling the process by which schools a¤ect their intake, (21) posits a functional relationship between the di¤erence in …rst stage investments, z i and z j , and the average ability of their intake. 18 Naturally, if a school increases its investment then it increases its average ability. Note that (21) implies´(0) = µ: if the two schools invest the same amount in stage 1, then their e¤orts cancel out and each has ability equal to the population average. The quadratic formulation for ¼ given in (22) dovetails neatly with (21), because of its convenient property that the students' best reply function depends only on the average ability and not on the entire distribution, as is evident from direct substitution of (22) into (9), where µ appears only linearly. To sum up, in stage 1, schools simultaneously choose z 1 and z 2 , thus determining the values of the average abilities, µ 1 and µ 2 : these are observed by the two schools, the students, and the employers. Note that the only 1 8 (21) implies that, in aggregate students respond continuously to changes in the difference in the schools' characteristics. Given our assumption that students are (ex-ante) identical, one may suppose that they would all react in the same way to exogenous changes in the parameters of their payo¤ functions. The theoretical industrial economics literature provides possible justi…cations for this continuous response: for example, students may be located in di¤erent geographical areas, so that for some them going to a given school is less convenient than for others (Hotelling 1929) . Alternatively, given the interpretation of z as marketing expenditures, the Butters (1977) model of advertising can be applied by saying that the probability of parents getting to know about a school increases with the school's expenditure on "marketing", z; if parents do not hear about a school they send their children to the local school. interaction between schools takes place in stage 1: this is natural, once the students are at schools, what happens elsewhere is irrelevant. Therefore, in each school, once z 1 and z 2 are …xed, the game analysed in Section 3 is played in isolation.
Lemma 4 The …rst order conditions for the …rst stage problem are given by:
Proof. In the second stage, the values of z i are …xed and therefore in the …rst stage school i maximises:
Di¤erentiating (23) which respect to z i we get the following …rst-order condition:
From (21) we know that at the symmetric equilibrium, The complex interaction in stage 2 described in Section 3 compounds with the stage 1 interaction between the schools, making it intractable to derive qualitative results (algebraically or geometrically). We therefore resort to numerical simulations. 19 In the present set-up the use of speci…c, relatively simple, functional forms is a strength, not a weakness, of the modelling strategy, as we intend to illustrate the multiplicity of possible outcomes: with more general functional forms the ambiguity could only be enhanced.
We therefore let:
where the parameters, ½, k,°, and ¾ are positive, and k < 1. In the simulations we also restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, where the two schools choose the same value of their long term investment. 20 This implies that all is relevant for the determination of a symmetric equilibrium is the slope of the function´when evaluated at 0,´0 (0). A higher value of´0 (0) denotes a fuller response of the average ability to di¤erence in the schools. This, clearly, is a variable that can be a¤ected by government policy, insofar as the government can a¤ect the degree of competition, for example by making it easier for parents to choose their school. Table 1 illustrates a sample of the simulations. The parameters are given by ¹ = 0:4, k = 0:9,´0 (0) = ½ = ¾ = 1,°= 3, and two values for ® are considered. For ease of presentation, when a variable is decreasing it is printed on a grey column. Table 2 illustrates that when the power of the incentive scheme,¸, increases, the schools shift e¤ort towards the …rst period: recruiting high ability students becomes more important, and schools exert more e¤ort to recruit them. This, however, increases the marginal cost of the e¤ort exerted in the second period. Consequently, the latter is reduced.What matters for the schools' quality is, however, the total e¤ort they exert, x + ¹z. This may increase or decrease with an increase in the power of the incentives scheme, as the two parts of the Tables show. In the upper part (with ® = ¡0:3), the school's quality x + ¹z increases with¸, which more than o¤sets the decreases in students' e¤ort e, so that every student's quali…cation improves (the last column in the table gives the value for the average quali…cation). The opposite, however, may happen: the reduction in x brought about by the increase in z (in turn determined by the increase in the power of incentives), combines with a reduction in e, and as a consequence the average quali…cation is now lowered by increases in the power of the incentive scheme. Di¤erent combinations are in general possible; however, we have not found any other patterns with the functional forms we have posited.
As Table 2 shows, the e¤ects of changes in the e¤ectiveness of competition, measured by the parameter´0 (0), is similar to that of changes in the power of incentives: the e¤ectiveness of the …rst period e¤ort is enhanced, and so schools shift e¤ort in that direction. Once at school, however, there is no e¤ect of the schools' e¤ort, as there was in the case of increases in¸, and, as shown by Table 2 , x decreases, and may do so to an extent su¢cient to reduce the overall school's quality (x + ¹z) and the average quali…cation of the students. As before, we have not found any set of parameter displaying a di¤erent pattern.
The exact role of each parameter in determining how the equilibrium responds to changes in the policy parameters is less interesting than the ambiguity in the e¤ects of these parameters: indeed, the main message of this section is that the e¤ects on the school results of providing schools with incentives and of making competition more e¤ective relationship are potentially perverse. At the very least, our analysis casts doubts on the belief that incentives are per se e¤ective.
A simple dynamic model of school competition.
One of the main reasons why parents prefer a school over another is because its exam results are better; this suggests a simple natural dynamic extension of our model, one where today's demand for places at a school is a¤ected by yesterday's results. 21 Formally, we assume that time is divided into periods, and that, in each period, the average ability of the pupils enrolled at school i depends on the di¤erence between the average quali…cation obtained by the students at the two schools in the previous period. This variable plays therefore the same role played by the z component of the school's investment, and, for the sake of simplicity, z is set to 0: a school's intake is only a¤ected by past results. Formally, in period t, t = 1; 2; : : :, the average ability of the students who are enrolled in school i, µ 1;t , is given by an increasing function of the di¤erence in the schools' average examination results:
where ¹ q i;t¡1 is the average quali…cation of the students attending school i in period t ¡ 1. As with´, we have h (0) = µ; we also have h (y) + h (¡y) = 2µ. We assume that school maximise the current period payo¤. 22 Let Q ¡ µ i ¢ denote the reduced form average quali…cation of the students attending a school where the average ability is µ i :
where e ¤ ¡ µ i ¢ and x ¤ ¡ µ i ¢ are the reduced form e¤ort levels exerted in equilibrium by students and the school when the average ability in the school is 2 1 Indeed the publications of school's league tables in the UK has been the main source of information for parents of prospective pupils, and one that has clearly a¤ected the intake in many schools. 2 2 That is, decision makers in schools have a discount factor of 0. This allows us to treat each period as a separate game, and eliminates the possibility of equilibria of the repeated game based on trigger strategies. We feel justi…ed in this assumption by the fact that the focus of this paper is on the interaction between schools, and not on the role of time preferences on the behaviour of schools. Since such preference are likely to be important in practice, because teachers may stay in a school for longer than a cohort of students, further research should take rigorously into account the possibility that the interaction between schools is best described by a repeated game. µ i (given by the solution of (9) and (10)). In period t, the average ability of the students in the two schools is given by:
Note that µ 1;t = µ = µ 2;t is always a steady state solution of the dynamical system (28). Whether this solution is locally stable depends in general depend on the stability condition:
Therefore, if Q 0 ¡ µ ¢ 6 0, that is if an increase in the average ability brings about lower schools and/or students' e¤ort which more than compensates for the increase in average ability, the symmetric equilibrium, µ 1;t¡1 = µ 2;t¡1 = µ, is locally stable. If, however, Q 0 ¡ µ ¢ > 0, that is if an increase in the average ability of a school's intake brings about an increase of the average quali…cation, then, for Q 0 ¡ µ ¢ and/or h 0 (0) high enough, the symmetric equilibrium is not stable. In this case, if there are stable equilibria, they are asymmetric. Since we are interested in …nding examples of these equilibria, we are again justi…ed in restricting the analysis to the functional forms used in the previous sections, (22) and (25)-( 27). In addition, we also assume that the function h is given by
While unusual, (30), depicted in Figure 3 , constitutes a natural choice. The ability distribution determines the average ability in the two schools in the event of complete segregation by ability, when all the students whose ability is above the median are in one school. These are denoted by µ max and µ min , and (30) implies that these can be reached only as the di¤erence between the average quali…cations in the two schools tends to 1. The only parameter of this adjustment function is therefore ±, which measures the speed with which parents respond to past di¤erence in results. Figure 3 illustrates this function for two values of ± (the dashed line denotes the higher speed of adjustment). Table 3b : α = −0.6, δ = 10, ρ = 0.9, k = 0.9, σ = 5, γ = 3 1. Table 3 : Effects of changes in the power of incentives on the equilibrium of the dynamic game. Table 3 illustrates the stable equilibrium for two sets of simulations, where¸increases in each set for the given values of the other parameters. These have been obtained data by starting from an initial average ability pair ¡ 1 2 + "; 1 2 ¡ " ¢ , and running the dynamical system until the di¤erence between the ability in each school in successive time periods was below a preset threshold.
A pattern common to all the simulations we have ran is that, as¸in-creases, the symmetric equilibrium ceases to be stable: increasing the power of incentives increases segregation. This is due to the fact that, at an equilib- rium, an increase in¸makes it worthwhile for the better school to increase e¤ort; this increases its average quali…cation, and so its attractiveness to students. Given our model speci…cation, the e¤ects is stronger for the better school, although it is conceivable that the opposite might be the case. The e¤ects on e¤ort are ambiguous. In Table 3a an increase in¸increases the e¤orts of both schools and the e¤ort of the students in both schools. Notice also that students and teachers work harder in the better school. In the lower part of the Table, the e¤ect on e¤ort is ambiguous: as¸increases, teachers work harder in the better school while students work less hard. The same is true in the lower ability school, when the incentives are su¢ciently powerful.
Note also that, when¸is such that the schools are not very di¤erent in intake, an increase in¸has opposite e¤ects on the quali…cation of the two schools: the "better" school responds to an increase in¸with an improvement in the quali…cation, the other school with a reduction (in Table 3b this happens for a smaller range of values for¸). This pattern is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows the average quali…cation in the two schools as a function of¸, and is caused by the reduction in the average ability of the intake, accompanied by the possible reduction in the school's e¤ort illustrated in the seventh column in Table 3b .
In Table 4 we consider the e¤ects of changes in ±, the e¤ectiveness of competition between schools. We …nd that when competition is weak the symmetric equilibrium ¡ 1 2 ; δ Table 4 : Effects of changes in the effectiveness on the equilibrium of the dynamic game.
ences are ampli…ed, and the better school becomes better, increasing both average ability of the intake and average quali…cation. The other school becomes worse both in terms of intake and of quali…cations. Competition generates segregation. 23 What seems to drive the students' attainment in the two schools, however, is the change in intake, as the wide variety of patterns which emerges with regard to e¤ort would suggest. This is shown in the last four columns of Table 4 . Of particular interest is the set of parameters given in Table  4d . Here results improve in school 1 and worsen in school 2 as competition becomes more e¤ective, despite that fact that students and teachers work more in the weaker school and less in the better school, and indeed both the students and the school work harder in the weaker school.
Concluding remarks.
The paper analyses the e¤ects of incentives in the education sector and competition between education institutions. A school's results depend on the school's investment and the school's teaching e¤ort, both of which are directly a¤ected by the incentives provided to schools, and by the students' e¤ort in learning.
The main messages of the paper are simply put: incentives may back…re and competition may have perverse e¤ects. This is due to the strategic interaction among the participants in the education process. For example, students may reduce their e¤ort when teachers increase theirs. This may dampen the e¤ect of increases in the power of incentives on the results. When schools interact with one another, their attempts to attract the better students further blurs the relationship between agents, to the point, as we show with robust and plausible functional forms and parameter combinations, that increases in the power of incentives and the e¤ectiveness of competition may reduce the students' attainment. To the exent that incentives are coslty, our analysis may be interpreted as providing a theoretical underpinning for the ambiguous relationship between resources and result which some literature has identi…ed (e.g., Hanushek 1986) . At the very least, our paper illustrates the importance of further theoretical research to clarify the interaction between schools and students.
